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NOTES
THE TRANSFER INHERITANCE TAX IN PENNSYLVANIA AND HOW
IT AFFECTS ANNUITIES
The tendency of the state toward a larger sharing in estates of decedents via
the medium of the Transfer Inheritance Tax by continuously and progressively
widening the scope of its embrasure is demonstrated clearly by a short historical
survey of various statutes since the passing of the first inheritance tax act in
Pennsylvania.
The basic act in Pennsylvania is that of April 7, 1826,1 entitled: "An Act,
Relating To Collateral Inheritances." Section one reads thusly:
"Be it enacted, etc .... all estates, real, personal, and mixed,
of every kind whatsoever, passing from any person who may dic
IP. L. 227.
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seized or possessed of such estate, being within this commonwealth,
either by will or under the intestate laws thereof, or any part of such
estate or estates, or interest therein, transferred by deed, grant, bargain or sale, made or intended to take effect, in possession or enjoyment after the death of the grantor or bargainer to any person or
persons, or to bodies politic or corporate, in trust or otherwise, than
to or for the use of father, mother, husband, wife, children, and
lineal descendants born in lawful wedlock . . . etc."
Next came the Act of March 11, 1850,2 which provided that where there shall
be a devise or bequest to collateral relatives or strangers liable to the collateral
inheritance tax, "to take effect in possession, or to come into actual enjoyment after
the expiration of one or more life estates, or a period of years," the donees can wait
until they come into actual possession before paying the tax, but must post security
with the Register of Wills until the tax is paid.
By the Act of May 4, 18558 it was enacted that one could pay the tax on a
future interest at the then value of the estate. This was to be determined by
deducting the value of the estate for years or life estate from the value of the fee.
With the advent of the Act of May 6, 1887,4 entitled: "An Act To Provide
for the Better Collection of Collateral Inheritance Taxes," the first really large
advance was made. This act repealed all former acts inconsistent with it and
made taxable estates located in Pennsylvania, and also estates located outside of
Pennsylvania, if the decedent were domiciled in Pennsylvania. Section one provided:
"Be it enacted, etc . . . .That all estates, real, personal and
mixed of every kind whatsoever, situated within this State, whether
the person or persons dying seised thereof be domiciled within or
out of the State, and all such estates situated in another State, Teritory, or country, when the person, or persons dying seised thereof
shall have their domicile within this Commonwealth ..... .etc."
By way of further broadening the scope of the inheritance tax, the Act of
July 11, 1917,5 imposed a two percent tax on direct inheritances, thereby covering
both the collateral and direct lines.
Our present day basic act is that of June 20, 1919,6 providing for the imposition and collection of certain taxes upon the transfer of property passing from a
2p. L.
3P. L.
4P. L.
5P. L.
6P. L.

170.
425.
79.
832.
521, 72 PS sec. 2301 et seq.
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decedent who was a resident of this Commonwealth at the time of his death, and
of property within this Commonwealth of a decedent who was a nonresident of
the Commonwealth at the time of his death.
This act repealed the acts of 1887 and 1917, supra, and imposed a two percent tax on direct inheritances and a five percent tax on collateral inheritances.
It reads:
"Be it enacted, etc . . . that a tax shall be and is hereby, im-

posed upon the transfer of any property, real or personal, or any
interest therein in trust or otherwise, to persons or corporations in
the following cases:
"(a) Where the transfer is by will or by the intestate laws of
the Commonwealth, etc.
-(c)

When the transfer is of property made by a resident . . .

by deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift, made in contemplation of the
death of the grantor, vendor, or donor, or intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after such death."
Following this, the Act of May 4, 1921,1 raised the tax from five to ten percent on collateral inheritances.
By an Act of March 28, 1929,8 it was provided that life insurance policies
made payable to a beneficiary other than the decedent's estate should be exempted
from inheritance taxes.
A later act of the same year 9 further enlarged the field to be covered by the
tax by adding to section (c) of the Act of 1919, supra:
"If such transfer is made within one year prior to the death of
the grantor, vendor, or donor of a material part of his estate, or in
the nature of a final disposition or distribution thereof, and without
an adequate valuable consideration, it shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death within the meaning of this clause."
To make the above provision operative, the Act of June 22, 1931,'0 included
in the title of the Act of 1919, supra, that such act taxes transfers made in contemplation of death.

7P. L. 341, 72 PS sec. 2302.

8p. L. 118, 72 PS sec. 2301.
9
May 16, 1929, P. L. 1795, 72 PS sec. 2301.
loP. L. 690, 72 PS sec. 2301.
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The latest move by the legislature to widen the embrace of the inheritance
tax laws of the Commonwealth was the Act of July 14, 1936,11 which provided
that the accrual to a surviving joint tenant of the interest of a deceased joint
tenant shall be deemed a transfer taxable under the act.
This brief summary indicates one thing clearly, that is: that the tendency and
intention of the legislature is and has been to extend the inheritance tax so as to
cover increasingly larger amounts of property passed by death and transfers
intended to take effect after death.
By way of showing how the courts followed this legislative intent until the
very recent annuity cases, the writer includes a review of past decisions.
The first case of importance to the knowledge of the author, which discussed
the inheritance tax as it first existed, was that of Wright's Appeal, 12 wherein a
decedent had assigned before his death $10,000 worth of stock to a trustee in
trust that he would pay the assignor the income for life, and after his death pay
certain sums and annuities to persons named in the trust, if they should outlive
him, and the remainder to the purpose to be declared in his will, reserving the
right to revoke all the trusts therein declared for other persons, but died without
such revocation. The court held that the sum so assigned was subject to the collateral inheritance tax imposed by the Act of April 7, 1826, supra, stating:
"The subject of the grant falls within the very words of the Act
of Assembly, as part of an estate transferred by deed, intended to
take effect in possession after his death. It took effect neither in
right nor in possession, until his death, because none were able to
take who did not survive him, and because he might revoke the
whole."
Next in order came the case which is most frequently cited with reference to
inheritance tax decisions by the courts of the state, whether they involve direct or
collateral tax. It was Reish v. Commonwealth." Here A, in his last sickness
conveyed his property in fee to his brother and only heir, B, for $1. At the same
time, B executed a bond conditioned for faithful payment to A, of the net income
of said property without fraud or delay. The court held that the property was
taxable under the Act of April 7, 1826, supra. As was said in the headnote:
"The owner of an estate cannot defeat the plain provisions of the Collateral
Inheritance Law, Act of April 7, 1826, by any device which secures to him for
life, the income, profits and enjoyment of his estate. Said law can only be de11936 First Ex. Sess., P. L. 44, 72 PS sec. 2301.
1238 Pa. 507 (1861).

18106 Pa. 521 (1884).
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feated by such conveyance as parts with the possession, title and enjoyment during
grantor's lifetime." (Italics added)
And to this present day in Pennsylvania, these three requirements as laid
down in this celebrated opinion form the criterion and test to ascertain whether
or not there has been a sufficient transfer of property so as to escape the death
transfer tax.
In Seibert's Appeal, 4 a will was written bequeathing property to certain collateral relatives and for religious and charitable purposes. Subsequently he transferred all his property by deed duly acknowledged, to the persons named as executors in his will, they to receive the income of the same to their own proper
use during the life of the testator and at his death to hold the same for the uses
and purposes set forth in his will. The court held the property subject to collateral inheritance tax under the Act of April 7, 1826, saying: "The property
which he sought to transfer was not to take effect in enjoyment until after his
death." (Italics added)
In Du Bois Appeal,15 grantor during his lifetime conveyed real and personal
property to grantee giving him "naked legal title liable to be defeated at any time
by the powers reserved to the grantor, or in case the grantee should die before the
grantor." The court held the property liable to the tax imposed by the Act of
April 7, 1826, supra, stating: "In this case the conveyance was not intended to
take effect in enjoyment during the lifetime of the grantor, nor in point of fact did
it or could it do so."
Also in Todd's Estate (No. 2),"6 the testatrix made a will bequeathing certain legacies and then paid over the principal sums to the legatees, taking from
them obligations to pay her interest on the same during the term of her natural
life, the court held such legacies were taxable under the Act of May 6, 1887,17
remarking:
"When the right to income is retained during the life of the grantor, the
conveyance, as to enjoyment does not take effect untit the death of the grantor."
Another line of cases is that involving trusts created by the donor during his
life wherein the trustee is to pay the income to the settler during his life. In these
the courts have uniformly held that since enjoyment does not pass until the death
of the settlor, the donees or beneficiaries must pay an inheritance tax on the property so received. As expressed by the court in Line's Estate:18 "The right of the
14110 Pa. 329, 1 Ad. 346 (1885).
15121 Pa. 368, 15 AdI. 641 (1888).
16237 Pa. 466, 85 Ad. 845 (1912).
17p. L. 79.
X8155 Pa. 78, 26 Ad. 728 (1893).
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Commonwealth to the tax was not defeated by a conveyance or a transfer of title
to the property during the lifetimt of the owner, nor by possession taken under
such conveyance, if the enjoyment of the property conveyed is not to take effect
antil the death of the grantor."1 9
Still another type of case, in which attempts were made to circumvent the
inheritance tax is that in which a gift of money designated as an annuity gift is
made before the donor's death to a charity or educational institution, and the
donor reserves interest at a specified rate upon the principal until death, said interest to be paid from the income derived from the annuity gift. The courts have
held that the so-called annuity gift is subject to the inheritance tax because enjoyment (viz. interest derived from the income of the gift) was retained during
the life of the donor. And though it was argued that this was an annuity, in
Barber's Estale,20 the court said:
"This income from the fund .

.

was not an annuity, as that

term is generally understood, unless the payment of interest on money
borrowed may be termed an annuity, which would be a new conception of the idea. If it were an annuity, the property of the fund
wouid become dissolved among the general properties of the Board
... .The distinction between the income here provided, and the
purchase of an annuity so strongly urged by the appellant is obvious." 21

Finally there is the true annuity which for the purposes of inheritance tax
has been held not taxable. The late case of Commonwealth v. Beisel22 contains
the first definition of an annuity in Pennsylvania law. In that case the learned
court, at page 521, describes an annuity as being:
" 'Annuity' is a term somewhat loosely used in financial and
legal nomenclature and is perhaps incapable of exact definition. Generally speaking, it designates a right-bequeathed, donated, or purchased-to receive fixed, periodical (it is not necessary that the payments be annual) payments, either for life or a number of years.
Its determining characteristic is that the annuitant has an interest
only in the payments themselves and not in any principal fund or
source from which they may be derived. The purchaser of an ant 9 See also Cooper's Estate, 320 Pa. 418, 183 At. 45 (1936); Husband's Estate, 316 Pa. 361,
175 At. 503 (1934); Leffman's Estate, 312 Pa. 236, 167 At. 343 (1933); Myer's Estate, 309 Pa.
581, 164 At. 611 (1932) ; Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 124 At. 176 (1924) ; Windolph v. Girard
Trust Co., 245 Pa. 349, 91 At. 634 (1914) ; Logan's Estate, 99 Pa. Super. 432 (1930) ; Arnold'5
Estate, 83 Pa. Super. 264 (1924).
20304 Pa. 235, 155 At. 565 (1931),
21See also Grosh Estate, 17 Lehigh 30 (1936) ; Butler's Estate, 19 D. & C. 172 (1933).
22338 Pa. 519, 13 A. (2d) 419 (1940).
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nuity surrenders all right and title in and to the money he pays for
it. On the other hand, where a debtor agrees to pay his creditor in
installments at regular intervals, the debt or principal sum itself is
due to the creditor although payable only in the manner agreed upon;
it is an account receivable in which he has an interest. Therefore,
installment payments of a debt or payments of interest on a debt,
'2 8
do not constitute an annuity."
The first intimation of the freedom of an annuity from inheritance tax, to the
best of the author's knowledge, came with the decision in Barber's Estate, supra.
Here a gift of money designated as an annuity gift was made before the donor's
death, in trust to a charity, and the donor reserved interest at a specified rate upon
this principal until her death, the principal to be held in perpetuity and the income
to be used in paying the percentage to the donor and the balance toward the
running expenses or equipment of the charity. The court in deciding that the
gift was subject to the inheritance tax said there was no annuity because the
property of the fund did not become dissolved among the general properties of
the charity; and that because the donor received part of the interest annually during her lifetime, she retained the enjoyment of the property; and since the enjoyment did not pass until her death, the fund was subject to the tax.
At last in Krause's Estate,24 the question was squarely presented, for the
first time, to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as to whether a true annuity
was liable to the state inheritance tax. These were the facts: The donor in consideration of two gifts, one of $35,000 and the other of $5,000 received in return
two writings, the material parts of one of which is as follows:
"Whereas Lewis D. Krause of Allentown, Penna., has given to
the Albright College, School of Theology of The Evangelical Church,
Reading, Pa., the sum of thirty-five thousand dollars. Now therefor, the said Albright College, etc. in consideration thereof, hereby
agrees to pay the said Lewis D. Krause during his natural life an
annuity of six (6) per cent, in semi-annual payments of one thousand fifty dollars each, said payments to cease on the death of said
Lewis D. Krause, and the said sum as donated by Lewis D. Krause
as aforesaid is to be considered as an executed gift to said Albright
College, etc. without any account or liability therefor." This writing was signed by the Treasurer of the college.
The court in deciding the gift was not subject to the inheritance tax of June
20, 1919,25 stated these questions were involved: "Was the gift made in con28See also Commonwealth v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 254 Pa. 510, 98 Atl. 1072
(1916).
24325 Pa. 479, 191 Ati. 162 (1937).
26p. L. 521, 72 PS sec. 2301 et ieq. as amended.
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templation of death? Was it intended to take effect in possession at or after
death? Was enjoyment of the fund postponed until death or thereafter?"
In answering these the court said. "Looking at this document we see that
the donor 'has given' the fund to the donee, that 'the said sum donated is to be
considered as an executed gift' to the college and 'belongs to' the college 'from
this date without any account or liability therefor.' In view of this plain language, it is difficult to see how it can be correctly said that the college did not
have the 'enjoyment' of the gift. It is obvious that the donor could not have
taken the fund away from the college. He retained no interest in the fund itself
or in the income therefrom." "It is arguud by the Commonwealth that because
an annuity, equal to six per cent annually on the principal of the gift, was to be
paid to the donor, enjoyment of the fund did not pass to the college until the
giver died. But the writing says that it did, that the.gift was an executed one when
made, and belonged to the recipient from this date without any account or liability
therefor.' There was no restriction on what the college could do with the money.
It could do with it as it pleased. The money had been mingled with the general
funds of the college (this is the reason for distinguishing the instant case from
Barber's Estate, ssupra, and other trusts cases, supra.) and is not held by it separate
and intact. It was not the fund which was liable for the payments to the donor
but the college itself." Here again the court cited the basic case of Reish v. Commonwealth, supra, quoting from it:
"One certainly cannot be considered, as in the actual enjoyment
of an estate, who has no right to the profits arising or accruing therefrom ..... .the whole matter depends on the single fact, whether
or not the transfer was made or intended to take effect, in enjoyment at the death of the grantor . . . . (to be free from tax) it
must be such a conveyance as parts with the possession, the title,
and the enjoyment in tht grantor's lifetime."
This apparently is the present theory of the court with regard to the imposition
of inheritance tax upon annuities: that so long as the conveyance passes possession,
title, and enjoyment, a gift or transfer so made will be exempt, if not made at
death or in contemplation of death.
But, it seems that by applying the court's theory and reasoning as used- in
the Krause case, the court itself has pointed out a way in which to avoid the inheritance tax, to wit: by making the same type of conveyance as used in the Krause
situation, and in return, receiving a promise to pay an agreed sum (to the donor),
expressly stating that said sum is not to come from the income of the gift, but
from other sources of revenue of the donee, and also mingling the gift with the
other funds of the donee. In this way, it would seem, that a wealthy man might
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pass large portions of his estate to his children or others in his lifetime, retain the
income thereof, and by means of such an agreement avoid payment of the transfer
inheritance tax.
Another question that is as yet unanswered, though created by the decision
stipulating annuities to be exempt from the inheritance tax is this: Assuming A
pays to B an outright sum of money under an agreement as in the Krause case,
and further provides that in the event he, A, should die, before an equivalent of
the sum paid to B had been repaid to him, A, in installments, then the balance is
to be paid to C until exhausted. Query, is the balance remaining on A's death
to be subjected to the transfer inheritance tax, or has C an inviolable contract
right in the sum as a third party beneficiary?
Will the court look behind the transaction for this purpose of taxing inheritancns as it does when it pierces the corporate veil for certain purposes, or will
it merely view the transaction in the light of the formula of words as laid down
in the gospel of Reish v. Commonwealth, that if title, possession, and enjoyment
pass, no inheritance tax can be levied?
The writer believes that the court will consider the social and 'economic factors which prompted the levying of an inheritance tax and adopt the concept which
is so clearly expressed in Tack's Estate,26 at page 548, where the court said:
"The right to transmit or to receive property by will or through
intestacy is not a natural right, but a creature of statutory grant.
Students of law agree that the State has the right to declare an escheat
of all the property of a decedent, and therefor, as the price of allowing a legatee, devisee or heir to inherit, it may appropriate to itself
any portion of the property which it chooses to exact. Whether
this appropriation be designated an inheritance tax, an estate tax, a
succession tax, a death duty, or otherwise howsoever, it is not, in its
essence, a tax on the decedent's property or any component part of
it, or on the transaction of transferring it as in the case of a transmission of possession or title inter vivos, but an excise on the privilege
of inheritance. It is really not a tax at all in the ordinary meaning
of the word, but rather a distributive share of the estate which the
State retains for itself. Its true nature is not changed by the fact
that it is assessed and measured by the value of the property, or
that it is paid by legatees and devisees in proportions allocated to
their respective inheritances."
REYNOLD
26325 Pa. 545, 191 At. 155 (1937).
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